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THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
Ward Farnsworth* 
The emergence and evolution of the economic loss rule is the most 
important development of the past generation in the American common 
law of torts.  It has also been the most confusing development. Courts have 
struggled to define the rule and have assigned it different boundaries in 
different states, making it a frequent source of puzzlement and dread for 
lawyers.  The American Law Institute’s Restatement Third, Torts:  Liability 
for Economic Harm has set out to assign the economic loss rule an accurate 
meaning and a useful purpose, and to clarify the scope of liability in tort 
for pure economic loss generally.  This purpose of this Article is to 
concisely explain the reasoning behind those efforts and the outcome of 
them.  
To summarize:  “Pure economic loss” means a financial loss 
unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage—in other words, 
a loss of money and nothing else.  A vanished investment, a decline in 
business, or a lost inheritance are typical examples.  Pure economic loss is 
the typical result of a breach of contract, but sometimes—and perhaps at 
the same time—it may be caused by negligence and therefore become the 
subject of efforts to recover in tort.  Indeed, plaintiffs recover in tort for 
pure economic losses every day, and suits of that kind are also dismissed 
every day.  Courts have made various rules recognizing, denying, or 
limiting tort liability for the infliction of economic loss, but the rules have 
been stated in many different ways, some of them broad, some narrow, 
many confusing. 
Most notably, some courts have offered an “economic loss rule” that 
states there is generally no recovery in tort for pure economic loss caused 
by a defendant’s negligence.  The exceptions to such a statement have 
turned out to be too numerous and unwieldy to make that version of the 
rule useful, as has become evident by hard experience.  While there often 
is good reason not to allow recovery in tort for pure economic loss, an 
overbroad formulation of the rule to that effect can sweep away claims or 
call liability into doubt in circumstances where the good reasons are not 
present and where liability is well justified. 
A much narrower form of “economic loss rule,” however, is both 
accurate and worth stating. It is that there is no liability in tort for pure 
economic loss resulting from negligence in the negotiation or performance 
                                                 
*  Dean and John Jeffers Research Chair, The University of Texas School of Law; Reporter, 
RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM.  For helpful comments and 
discussion, I thank Jay Feinman, Mark Gergen, Victor Goldberg, Vincent Johnson, Andrew 
Kull, Richard Posner, Jane Stapleton, and members of the American Law Institute’s 
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of a contract.  Several associated rules have also evolved that make clear 
the existence of duties, or the non-existence of them, in most situations in 
which pure economic loss is common.  On the side of liability, for example, 
it safely may be said that claims to recover for economic loss may be 
brought in tort against professionals by their clients, and against a 
defendant who has acted for the purpose of providing the plaintiff with a 
basis for reliance (and on whose words or acts the plaintiff did reasonably 
rely).  Conversely, there is no liability in tort for pure economic loss caused 
to a plaintiff by a personal injury or property damage to a third party. 
The rules just summarized are consistent with the best rationales for 
denying liability in tort when a defendant has negligently caused pure 
economic loss to a plaintiff.  The first of those rationales is deference to a 
contract in cases where the plaintiff and defendant have one, or where 
future parties in their circumstances can reliably be counted on to protect 
their interests in that way.  The second rationale is the undesirability of 
imposing runaway or indeterminate liability on a defendant.  The rules 
summarized above and explained herein reflect several important 
categorical judgments about when those rationales call for liability and 
when they do not.  Claims outside those categories are relatively 
infrequent and miscellaneous.  They are best resolved by directly 
considering how the general policies just stated bear upon them.  That 
inquiry is necessarily performed case by case until results accumulate in 
sufficient numbers to allow recognition of additional crystallized rules. 
I.  THE TRIBUTARIES 
The efforts to state an “economic loss rule” have resulted from the 
confluence of three or four doctrinal tributaries.  The tributaries are 
discrete doctrines that regulate the ability of a plaintiff to recover in tort 
for pure money losses caused by negligence.  The “economic loss rule,” 
whatever it may mean, is typically an effort to sum up these different 
doctrines and generalize from them.1  Each of the tributaries might be (and 
has been) the subject of long disquisitions, but for our purposes a brief 
summary of them will do.  We are not concerned here with their details or 
with their rationales, which will be considered later.  The point is just to 
see the different patterns and results that some courts have been moved 
to capture with various statements of a general rule. 
                                                 
1 For influential prior discussions, see JAY FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE § 1.3.2 
(1995); Fleming James Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence:  A 
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for 
Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss:  A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1513–14 (1985); Jane 
Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss:  Lessons From Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory,” 50 
UCLA L. REV. 531, 533 (2002). 
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A. Products 
As the law of products liability expanded in the 1960s, courts also 
developed a limiting principle:  plaintiffs cannot collect in tort when a 
product merely disappoints their economic expectations.  An exploding 
toaster entitles anyone it injures to collect tort damages from the seller; if 
the toaster won’t toast, however, the remedies must be found under the 
law of contract.  This doctrine is commonly associated with Seely v. White 
Motor Co.,2 a 1965 opinion of the California Supreme Court written by 
Chief Justice Roger Traynor.  The decision explained that while public 
policy called for a right to recover in tort for all who suffered personal 
injuries on account of a defective product, the law of warranty is sufficient 
to handle claims that a product’s defects caused only economic loss.  That 
principle has since been accepted in all states. It also has been frequently 
supplemented by the proposition that while property damage caused by 
a defective product may be redressed in tort, the damage must occur to 
property other than the product.  When a product causes damage just to 
itself, the resulting harm is considered economic in character. 
B. Service Contracts 
The rule just stated for cases that involve products is related to a larger 
and older pattern that might be considered distinct.  Sometimes a party 
will be negligent in performing a contract and will breach it as a result.  In 
addition to suing the promisor for breach of contract, can the promisee 
bring a claim in tort to recover for the negligence?  The answer has long 
been yes when the breach causes personal injury to the promise:  you hire 
a mover to put your goods onto a truck, and he promises to do it carefully; 
he is careless, and drops a box on your foot; he breached his contract, but 
you have the option of suing in tort to recover for your injuries.3  The point 
is not that the contract creates obligations enforceable in tort.  The point, 
rather, is that duties in tort to avoid the infliction of personal injury exist 
independently and are not extinguished by the existence of a contract 
between the parties (unless the contract contains an explicit and 
enforceable disclaimer to that effect).  But the answer is otherwise when 
the contractor hired to build your house negligently delays or otherwise 
                                                 
2 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 1965); see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986). 
3 Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Herbold, 483 P.2d 664, 669 
(Idaho 1971); Finnell v. Seismic, 67 P.3d 339, 344 (Okla. 2003); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. 
Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947); Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901, 903–04 (Wis. 
1951); see also Dunn v. Praiss, 638 A.2d 875, 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), rev’d on other 
grounds, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995). 
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bungles the work.  Your remedies are on the contract, not in tort.4  (And 
yet you can recover for money losses without personal injury when the 
negligent breach of a contract is committed by your lawyer, your 
accountant, or another professional—for reasons to be discussed below.) 
C. Breach of a Contract Between Other Parties 
Suppose you are hurt as a side effect of one party’s breach of contract 
with another.  If you suffer personal injury or property damage, then once 
again your ability to sue in tort is clear.  (So if the mover you’ve hired 
drops a box on a bystander’s foot, the bystander can sue the mover 
without controversy.)  If you suffer money losses without personal injury, 
sometimes you can sue in tort and sometimes you can’t.  A town hires you 
to do a construction job, and then also hires a consultant to evaluate your 
work.  The consultant negligently and incorrectly reports that your work 
was substandard, so you are forced to spend money redoing it.  The 
negligent report was a breach of the consultant’s contract with the town, 
and it made you worse off, but you can’t sue the consultant to recover in 
tort.5  The contract between them was not made for your benefit, and you 
did not rely on it—or if you did, your reliance was incidental; the purpose 
of their contract was to serve the town’s interest, not yours.  On the other 
hand, suppose that a firm, eager to persuade you to buy shares of its stock, 
hires an accountant to perform an audit of its financial statements.  The 
accountant produces a favorable report, and the firm sends it to you.  You 
find the report convincing, you buy the shares, and the company then goes 
bankrupt; the accountant turns out to have been negligent.  You can sue 
the accountant,6 and the common law has occasionally recognized liability 
on other such patterns.7  Again, the reasons will be considered in due 
course.  
D.  Personal Injury or Property Damage to Another Party 
Suppose, finally, that a plaintiff suffers money losses as a side effect 
of a tort that the defendant committed against a third party. A trucker 
negligently tries to pass under a low bridge and destroys it; a restaurant 
on the far side of the bridge loses business as a result.8  Or the goalie of a 
hockey team is run over by a bus, and the owner of the team suffers losses 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 506 (Vt. 2007). 
5 Plourde Sand & Gravel v. JGI Eastern, 917 A.2d 1250, 1255–56 (N.H. 2007). 
6 See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 772–74 (Cal. 1992). 
7 A famous instance is Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276–77 (N.Y. 1922). 
8 Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 270 (N.J. 1945). 
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when attendance at the team’s games goes down.9  It has generally been 
the rule at common law that the owner of the restaurant or the hockey 
team cannot recover in tort against the negligent parties in these 
circumstances.10 
II.  THE FLOOD 
Courts have observed the patterns just set forth and have sought to 
generalize from them.  Each of the patterns sets a limit on a plaintiff’s 
ability to recover in tort for pure economic loss.  A number of courts have 
therefore announced an “economic loss rule” to the effect that there is, in 
general, no recovery in tort for pure economic loss resulting from 
negligence.11  A statement that broad must be swiftly and extensively 
qualified, and so it has been:  The rule does not apply to claims of negligent 
misrepresentation.12  The rule does not apply when the parties have a 
special relationship.13  The rule does not apply to claims against 
professionals.14  The rule does not apply to claims by fishermen.15  The rule 
does not apply when a lawyer botches the drafting of a will and is sued 
by someone who otherwise would have inherited a bequest but did not.16  
And so on.  These exceptions have drained the general rule of much of its 
clarity and utility.  A long list of exceptions, especially when the list is 
unsettled, makes it hard for the lawyer or judge to keep the law straight 
or to advise about it with confidence. 
The problems have been made worse by a massive explosion in the 
reliance on the so-called economic loss rule and by inconsistency in its 
meaning.  The expression “economic loss rule,” or “economic loss 
                                                 
9 Phoenix Prof’l Hockey Club v. Hirmer, 502 P.2d 164, 165 (Ariz. 1972). 
10 See Hirmer, 502 P.2d at 165; Rickards, 41 A.2d at 268. 
11 See, e.g., Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (Idaho 2005); Nebraska 
InnKeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1984); 
Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Lib. v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind. 
2010); Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 v. Stern, 
651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. 
Ass’n 560 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1990); Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67, 
70 (Vt. 2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 657 (W. Page 
Keeton et al. eds., 1984). 
12 See, e.g., Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go, L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Iowa 2011); 
Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Lib., 929 N.E.2d at 730. 
13 See, e.g., Blahd, 108 P.3d at 1001; Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000). 
14 See McStowe v. Bornstein, 388 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Mass. 1979); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 
So.2d 926, 929 (Miss. 1982); Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 913 
(Mont. 1990); Shoemake ex rel. Guardian v. Ferrer, 225 P.3d 990, 992 (Wash. 2010). 
15 See, e.g., Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216, 1223 (Fla. 2010). 
16 See Harrigfield v. J.D. Hancock, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (Idaho 2004); Calvert v. Scharf, 619 
S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 2005). 
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doctrine,” appeared fewer than thirty times in American cases before 1985; 
since then they have been used in more than 5000 cases.  But the cases do 
not all describe the scope of the rule in the same way.  Some courts 
mention more exceptions of the kind recited in the previous paragraph, 
and some mention fewer.  Some use the expression just to refer to one or 
two of the four patterns listed in the previous section; they treat the phrase 
as referring to the rule in products cases,17 or just to the rule that prevents 
a party from suing in tort over a breach of contract.18  This, too, has made 
life difficult for lawyers.  They may know that a given jurisdiction claims 
to subscribe to the economic loss rule, but be unclear on what its 
implications are—and the courts in the state may not be sure themselves.  
A practitioner can then be put in the unsatisfactory position of advising a 
client that the courts of a state are hostile to tort claims for pure economic 
loss, but without being able to specify where the hostility starts and stops. 
Stating a broad rule against recovery for pure economic loss in tort 
has an additional worrisome consequence beyond the confusion it has 
caused.  It creates a presumption against liability in cases that don’t fit into 
one of the well-defined exceptions.  This can cause legitimate claims to be 
snuffed out inadvertently by the sweep of the rule in the background.  
Trouble predictably results when a rule is recited and extended without 
attention to its rationale; sure enough, some states have found themselves 
in difficult and embarrassing positions when they stated aggressive 
versions of the economic loss rule and then discovered that the “rule” they 
had stated had implications they did not intend or came to regret.19  A 
presumption against liability for economic loss is unobjectionable if there 
are good reasons for it.  But if the “rule” is nothing but a generalization 
about those four categories listed above, it should not result in a 
presumption with respect to any cases that the categories do not include; 
and the categories themselves must be defined and qualified with care. 
Pressing in the other direction, however, may be a nagging suspicion 
that the economic loss rule really should reach beyond the categories that 
gave rise to it, and should suggest a general resistance toward the recovery 
in tort for the loss of money without physical harm.  That general 
resistance, untethered to any specific policy or factual setting, is hard to 
defend.  As an instinctive matter it might seem tempting to regard pure 
financial losses, however regrettable, as naturally a lesser priority for the 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Peachtree Doors, 659 A.2d 
267, 270 (Me. 1995); Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 653 
(Okla. 1990); Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 687 S.E.2d 47, 49 (S.C. 2009). 
18 See, e.g., Flagstaff Affordable Housing Ltd. P’ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 
669 (Ariz. 2010); General Elec. Co. v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 636, 637 (Ga. 2005). 
19 See Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 110 So.3d 399, 404 (Fla. 
2013). 
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law of torts than protection against personal injury.  “It’s only money,” 
one might say, and while everyone would much prefer to have more of it 
rather than less, surely we all are more concerned about protecting the 
personal safety of potential victims than we are about protecting their 
bank accounts.  But this is mostly nonsense.  Money is just a placeholder 
for property, and thus for the time, choices, and opportunities of its 
owners.  It requires no tutoring to see that a purely monetary loss can be 
as serious to its victim as any other kind, and indeed that a serious 
monetary loss may be a far graver thing than a less substantial personal 
injury.  (Ask any victim of Bernard Madoff’s.) 
The point of these observations is not that purely financial interests 
should always receive the same protection from the law of tort as the 
interest in safety from physical harm.  They should not and do not.  The 
point, rather, is that the different treatment should depend on specific 
reasons why tort is a more or less advantageous way to regulate the risks 
involved in a case, particularly as compared to alternative sources of 
protection such as contract.20  This point is worth emphasizing because the 
economic loss rule is often intoned without reflection on its rationale, as if 
we all know that tort law isn’t really meant to fix financial mishaps.  But 
sometimes tort law is meant for that purpose; and understanding why it 
may be, and why not, is essential when resolving close cases in this corner 
of the law. 
In sum, the economic loss rule has become an important proposition 
in the tort jurisprudence of nearly every state.  But it has meant different 
things in different places, and in some states it has been said to mean 
things that aren’t clear, or that can’t be right, or that lack a clear 
justification. And yet the desire to state such a rule is understandable.  The 
various doctrines that determine when plaintiffs can recover in tort for 
pure economic loss do have points in common, and they invite a rational 
and simple account of their relationships if one can be devised.  The task 
at hand, then, is to see what generalizations might fairly be made about 
recovery in tort for pure economic loss—generalizations broad enough to 
be useful but narrow enough to be accurate without requiring so many 
exceptions that the value of generalizing is lost.  And we should seek to 
base those generalizations on clearly defensible policies, so that whatever 
the law may do can be explained on better grounds than a conclusory 
“because it’s economic loss.” 
                                                 
20 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 523, 547–48 (2009); Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss 
Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 869 (2006). 
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III.  THE RATIONALES 
As already noted, financial losses can be just as devastating to their 
victims as losses of other kinds, but they are less likely than physical 
harms to be redressable in tort.  In this Section we will consider the policies 
that might reasonably lie behind those various limitations. 
A. Deference to Contract 
Pure economic losses are often better suited than physical harms to 
management by contract. First, economic loss without physical injury 
does not usually befall a plaintiff randomly in the way that ordinary 
accidents might.  While the scenarios that produce pure economic loss are 
wide-ranging in their details, most of them have this in common:  they 
arise from a transaction.  The plaintiff is buying a house or a car or is 
making an investment, or is entering a partnership, or is making a hire (or 
is being hired).  The economic loss results when the transaction goes 
badly.  The transactional setting of these situations gives the potential 
victim an ability to consider the risks at issue in advance, and with a 
deliberation not available to the usual victim of an accident.  That 
consideration might lead to various steps:  the buyer might decide to 
purchase insurance, or draft a more careful contract with the seller, or 
make deeper investigation of the subject matter of the deal. 
The kinds of self-protective measures just noted are especially likely 
to be appealing when a buyer is confronted with financial risk.  While 
money losses may be just as serious as physical injuries, they are more 
easily remedied with money.  A party who suffers a financial loss but is 
reimbursed for it by insurance or in some other way is likely to be left 
indifferent, or at any rate far closer to indifferent than a party who receives 
monetary compensation for loss of limb.  A buyer might therefore have 
fairly specific ideas about how to deal with the risk of financial 
disappointment resulting from a deal, and might well prefer to handle it 
in some way other than by allocating responsibility for it to the seller.  A 
contract can capture those preferences. 
We worry less about these points when considering risks of physical 
harm.  If a patient makes a contract with a doctor to perform an operation, 
we are reasonably confident about where responsibility for the doctor’s 
due care should lie:  with the doctor, who therefore will buy insurance and 
may pass that cost on to the patient (or the patient’s insurer) without many 
doubts on either side about the desirability of that allocation of risk.  When 
a buyer makes a business deal with a seller, our sense of certainty about 
where to assign responsibility for the risks at stake is much less clear.  
Letting the buyer decide by making whatever contractual arrangements 
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seem best is thus more appealing than asking a court to make the 
determination in response to a tort suit. 
In addition, the law of contract is better equipped than the law of tort 
to redress a buyer’s financial disappointment when a deal turns out badly.  
On an economic view the law of tort often is viewed as a set of rules to 
govern the obligations of parties who do not have contracts; tort law 
provides substitutes for the contracts that the parties do not have and 
cannot easily make, but likely would if they could.21  Tort law also has 
evolved largely to address cases like the medical situation described a 
moment ago—cases in which considerations of public policy make the 
correct assignment of responsibility clear.  The law of contract is designed 
to address a different set of interests and advance a different set of policies.  
It assumes that the parties know best how to allocate the risks that 
confront them, and it creates a framework of doctrines to decide whether 
and how those allocations have been effectively made.  That aptly 
describes the positions of parties who enter a transaction and are looking 
for ways to protect themselves against financial disappointment.  The law 
of contract also has elaborate and refined doctrines for the calculation of 
damages.  Those doctrines are very useful when a party suffers financial 
loss because a transaction has gone wrong.  The doctrines that govern 
damages in tort have been developed mostly in response to cases that 
involve physical injuries.  Applying those doctrines to cases involving 
financial loss from a breach of contract is a bit like trying to turn a screw 
with a pair of pliers.  The tool was not made for the job, and we have other 
tools that were. 
The claim I mean to press is not just that contract law is more sensitive 
than tort law to the interests involved when a transaction leads to financial 
disappointment, though that much is true.  It is also that using tort law to 
address such cases can affirmatively interfere with the operation of 
contract law, making contracts a less dependable instrument for settling 
commercial relations with finality.  Using contract law to govern 
commercial transactions lets parties and their lawyers know where they 
stand and what they can expect to follow legally from the words they have 
written.  But if a disappointed buyer has the option of abandoning the 
contract and suing in tort, the significance of the contract is diminished 
and the doctrines that protect the integrity of the contractual process are 
reduced in importance.  Parties wrangle over integration clauses to make 
clear that their obligations are the ones stated in the contract and nothing 
else; the point of bothering about such matters becomes unclear if a 
                                                 
21 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 323 (2010). 
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disappointed party can later invoke an outside set of obligations that are 
imposed on the promisor and defined by the law of tort. 
B. Indeterminate and Disproportionate Liability 
The discussion so far has explained the usefulness of contract, and the 
frequent inaptitude of tort, for allocating risks of economic loss when a 
party enters a transaction.  But there is another set of reasons why courts 
are sometimes reluctant to impose liability in tort for pure economic loss.  
It involves the potential for economic losses to proliferate in ways that 
physical damage does not.  Most accidents result in damage that is limited 
and determinate in time, in space, and in the number of victims involved.  
There are famous exceptions—some colorful cases in which property 
damage has spun out of control to a surprising degree, and cases as well 
in which negligent conduct has turned out to imperil an unexpectedly 
large number of plaintiffs.22  But medical malpractice, a badly-driven car, 
and a slippery sidewalk typically imperil those nearby and nobody else. 
Economic losses can ripple out in a much different way. 
This concern typically arises when the plaintiffs in a case were made 
worse off by a tort that the defendant committed against a third party.  The 
tort might be the aforementioned destruction of a bridge that the plaintiff 
did not own but that the plaintiff’s customers relied upon to reach the 
plaintiff’s business—and every other business in the neighborhood.23  The 
concern can also arise when the plaintiff is made worse off by the 
defendant’s breach of contract with a third party.  If by some negligence I 
fail to perform my contractual obligation to deliver goods to you, then you 
can’t deliver them to your retailer, and the retailer can’t deliver them to its 
customers.  All of them may have economic losses, all of which were 
foreseeable when I committed my breach.  Imposing liability for such 
harms, even limited by the criterion of foreseeability, would result in a 
great increase in the litigation over many negligent incidents.  The costs of 
that litigation do not seem likely to be justified by a commensurate 
improvement in safety or security.24  On the contrary, the indeterminate 
scope of such liabilities might well put an exaggerated pressure on some 
potential defendants to avoid activities altogether if those ripple effects 
are a possible consequence.25 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 822–23 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
23 See Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 268 (N.J. 1945); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet 
Foods, Inc., v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1099–1100 (N.Y. 2001). 
24 For discussion, see Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985). 
25 See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1987); William Bishop, Negligent 
Misrepresentation Through Economists’ Eyes, 96 L. Q. REV. 360, 365–66 (1980). 
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It is further the case that potential victims of “rippling” economic 
losses can often (though not always) seek protection by other means, 
many of them involving contracts of one sort or another.  Suppose the 
plaintiffs were injured economically because they had contracts with the 
party who was the immediate victim of the defendant’s breach; in that 
case they can use those contracts to collect damages from whoever lies 
between them and the defendant.  If the plaintiff lost business because the 
defendant’s negligence destroyed a nearby bridge or otherwise obstructed 
access by its customers, the contractual solution might be business-
interruption insurance purchased in advance.  These options may not be 
enough to make “deference to contract,” in itself, an appealing ground for 
withholding tort liability from such plaintiffs when they suffer economic 
losses.  But they suggest that withholding such liability on other 
grounds—that is, because the defendant’s exposure would become 
indeterminate, and perhaps crushing—is not necessarily as hard a blow as 
it may seem. Such plaintiffs frequently have other possible recourse. 
C. Private vs. Social Cost 
A final reason why the law might not want to recognize tort liability 
for pure economic loss has been suggested by economists.26  It is that many 
cases of economic loss to one party involve an offsetting economic gain to 
another.  If customers cannot reach a restaurant because the bridge leading 
to it has been destroyed by the defendant’s negligence, other restaurants 
will probably capture their business.  The loss of business for the first 
restaurant is painful for its owner, but the gain of business by the second 
restaurant is delightful to the same extent for its owner.  So the world is 
about as happy and wealthy a place after the accident as beforehand.  
Well, not quite; the customers’ disappointment at having to settle for their 
second choice of restaurant is a real loss.  But it is a mild one from a social 
standpoint, and bears no particular connection to the damages suffered by 
the restaurant owner who brings suit.  The same might be said if a lawyer’s 
mistake causes a bequest to be left to the wrong heir.  It is too bad for the 
intended heir, but great news for the unintended one. 
The point is not that the law should be indifferent to destroyed bridges 
or lawyers’ mistakes.  It is that rectifying the economic losses felt by the 
losers in these situations is not a high priority.  We can leave redress to the 
destroyed bridge to a suit brought by the bridge’s owner and not worry 
about the restaurant at the end of the road, and we can leave redress 
                                                 
26 See William Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 1, 1 (1982); Richard A. 
Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts:  An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 
740 (2006). 
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against the bad lawyer to his client or perhaps let the intended heir sue 
the unintended one in restitution. There is no need for tort law. 
So goes the economist’s reasoning; but the importance to be assigned 
to that perspective is a matter of debate.  The most familiar objection is 
that courts deciding tort cases, even when they involve pure economic 
loss, are not only interested in minimizing social losses.27  They are 
concerned as well with unjust transfers of wealth.  Whether for that reason 
or others, courts have not seen fit to rely on this justification when they 
deny recovery in tort to a plaintiff in a case where the economist’s 
reasoning might apply.  We therefore will not assign much weight to this 
argument, but note it as a possible source of reinforcement of the other 
points made here. 
IV.  THE RESULTS 
We have seen several sound reasons why courts might legitimately 
hesitate before recognizing liability in tort for pure economic loss.  The 
principal ones can be summarized as deference to contract law and fear of 
disproportionate or indeterminate liability.  Equipped with these policies, 
we are in a position to consider what doctrines would sensibly advance 
them.  It is clear that the policies are broad enough to cut across a wide 
range of situations, and might bear on all four of the patterns discussed at 
the outset of this Article.  But it is also clear—or soon will be evident—that 
their force is stronger in some circumstances than in others, and in some 
cases may be nonexistent.  Our goal will be to state principles that can be 
justified by reference to the specific policies outlined above rather than by 
a blanket hostility to recovery for economic loss in tort.  And in 
undertaking this exercise we should be mindful of some more general 
policies as well:  the values of clarity and simplicity.  Complicated and 
subtle doctrines are expensive.  They make outcomes of cases hard for 
lawyers to predict, and so make it hard for clients to plan, and they 
increase the likelihood of error in their application.  A set of rules that can 
be explained and understood in five minutes is better—and not trivially 
better, but importantly better—than a set that takes hours. 
In pursuit of these objectives, the American Law Institute has settled 
on the following set of principles. 
                                                 
27 See Rabin, supra note 20, at 863. 
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A. Duties to Avoid Causing Economic Loss Must Be Specifically Established 
Duties to avoid negligently causing physical harm are general:  they 
arise when anyone takes action that creates a risk of harm to others.28  
Duties to avoid causing economic loss do not work that way.  They have 
to be established on some particular ground.  This is not quite the same as 
saying that there is a general “no duty” rule with respect to economic loss.  
That way of speaking would create a presumption against liability in new 
cases, and no such presumption is warranted or intended.  It is better just 
to say that duties to avoid causing economic loss have to be specifically 
found and justified, that only a few such duties have been recognized thus 
far, and that new cases will be dealt with from an initial position of 
agnosticism.  But not all cases are new cases; indeed, most are not.  
Generalizations have crystallized concerning the treatment of the most 
common situations that give rise to economic loss.  When cases fall within 
those generalizations, they can be resolved by rule rather than by analysis 
of how the policies in this field apply to the facts.  The established and 
available rules are set forth under the following headings. 
B. A Plaintiff Cannot Recover in Tort for Pure Economic Loss Caused by 
Negligence in the Negotiation or Performance of a Contract Between the 
Parties 
This is the principle to which the ALI applies the label “economic loss 
rule.”  It is more modest than some other statements of the rule that courts 
have announced.  But it is also more defensible and more robust.  (It has 
just one principal exception, which will be stated in a moment.)  If two 
parties have a contract, the rationale for keeping tort law out of their 
affairs is at its strongest.  Denying a tort remedy means that parties who 
allocate financial risks by contract need not fear that their settlements will 
be undone later by judgments in tort that have nothing to do with their 
agreements but instead reflect social judgments about negligence. 
And let us recall that negligence is our subject here.  A defendant who 
commits fraud in the making or performance of a contract may be sued in 
tort.  The economic loss rule does not enter in to such a case, nor does the 
rest of the apparatus set out in this Article.  The reason is that most parties 
don’t treat the chance that they are lying to each other as an ordinary 
subject for their contract to allocate.  They assume honesty in each other 
as a backdrop to their dealings.  Letting them sue for fraud therefore does 
not interfere with the contractual allocation of risks between them.  (If 
                                                 
28 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 6, 2005). 
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sophisticated parties clearly do allocate the risk of fraud in their contract, 
then that allocation should be respected.)  Risks of negligence are 
different.  Everyone understands that honest mistakes are part of 
commercial life, and there is nothing odd about allocating the risk of them 
away from oneself or in any given direction.  That is why negligence in 
the performance of a contract is considered a matter for resolution under 
the terms of the contract.  This principle covers and explains the rule of 
Seely v. White Motor Co., but also many other cases that do not involve 
products. 
Here is an example.29  Buyer purchases a house from Seller. Seller 
assures Buyer that the septic system is in good working order.  Buyer 
moves in and discovers that the septic system doesn’t work at all; Seller’s 
assurance was incorrect and negligent—but not (let us assume) 
fraudulent.  Buyer has a good contract claim against Seller, but not a claim 
in tort. One might wonder why it matters; so long as Buyer can recover on 
one theory or another, what difference does it make which it is?  If Buyer’s 
contract remedy is available, then indeed the availability of a tort claim for 
negligence shouldn’t matter.  The difficulties arise when something goes 
wrong with the contract claim.  Perhaps local law (or the contract itself) 
gave Buyer only a short time to complain about incorrect assurances that 
Seller made in their purchase and sale agreement.  The contract claim is 
then in trouble, so Buyer might naturally like to turn for help to the law of 
tort.  After all, Seller was negligent, and negligence is the stuff of tort 
claims.  But letting Seller take that route would render pointless the 
various constraints on Buyer’s contract claim.  The time limits for suit on 
a contract become impotent if a party frustrated by them can simply sue 
in tort to recover for what amounts to the same conduct that the contract 
suit would have redressed.  
This doctrine can still call for some judgments in application.  The fact 
that two parties have a contract does not mean that all tort claims for 
economic loss between the two of them are foreclosed.  The claims must 
arise within the scope of their contract.  If one side negligently misleads 
the other about a matter outside their agreement, the misled party may 
have a good claim to recover for the losses that result (under the logic of 
item [4] below).30  On the other hand, the economic loss rule is broad 
enough to exclude from tort all claims between contracting parties that are 
addressed by the law of contract.  Thus consider the same facts sketched 
above in which Buyer is disappointed with the septic system after Seller 
negligently promised that it worked.  Suppose Seller’s promise wasn’t 
                                                 
29 Based on Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2007). 
30 See Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1994); Geosearch, Inc. v. 
Howell Petroleum Corp., 819 F.2d 521, 523–24 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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made in writing; it was an oral assurance, and the local law of contract 
would treat the assurance as unenforceable under the parol evidence rule.  
Letting the plaintiff sue in tort for negligence would be an end run around 
the parol evidence rule and would tend to eviscerate it.  Some might 
welcome that result:  maybe the parol evidence rule is being applied too 
harshly in such a case, or is largely foolishness in general.  If so, however, 
the best course of action is to reform the rule, not to gut it, and retard the 
development of sound contract law, by letting parties escape from it into 
the law of tort. 
The same principles apply to claims that arise from negotiations that 
never ripen into contracts.  The law of contract and the law of restitution 
provide remedies for parties who suffer economic loss on account of other 
parties’ statements in contract negotiations.  If those remedies are 
insufficient, they should be improved, not avoided by basing tort claims 
on the same facts.  A fine example is furnished by the Red Owl case that 
first-year law students read in their contracts class.31  The plaintiff is led 
on by representatives of a chain of grocery stores who cause him to think 
that he will be given a franchise to operate one if he takes various onerous 
and expensive steps.  He takes the steps and never gets the franchise.  The 
representations that the defendants made might have been negligent, but 
the Buyer has no claim in tort.  The representations were made in the 
course of negotiating a contract, so the Buyer’s remedy is under that body 
of law alone.  It may be a case of promissory estoppel, as the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court supposed. 
Some observers, of course, have considered promissory estoppel to 
resemble liability in tort and have wondered whether the doctrine should 
be considered an instance of tort rather than contract.  But the Second 
Restatement of Contracts laid claim to promissory estoppel,32 and in my 
judgment is welcome to it.  Whatever one may think about promissory 
estoppel in general or the Red Owl decision in particular, the law of 
contract and the law of restitution have rules and case law that speak 
directly to the conduct of parties when they negotiate contracts.  Those 
bodies of law specify remedies to which such parties are entitled if the 
contract is not concluded.33  The law of tort has nothing useful to add to 
them, and so should stand aside. 
                                                 
31 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276–77 (Wis. 1965). 
32 See RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
33 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 4 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 6, 2005). 
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C. There Is an Exception to the Economic Loss Rule for Claims Brought Against 
Professionals by Their Clients 
A rule with no exceptions would be perfect.  A rule with one principal 
exception is still quite good.34  The principal exception to the economic 
loss rule involves suits for professional negligence, otherwise known as 
malpractice.  Simply put, lawyers and accountants and others like them 
can be sued in tort (as well as contract) if they negligently cause economic 
harm to their clients.35 
The reasons are easy to explain.  A “professional” is a member of an 
occupational group that typically requires formal training and a license to 
join, that has its own internal code of conduct, and that calls for complex 
discretionary judgments from its members in the course of their work.36  
When defendants fall into that category, the law is not so inclined to defer 
to the contracts they may have with their clients.  The licensing 
requirements serve as evidence that the legal system is not content to let 
the parties’ obligations be defined by their contracts; evidently there is a 
social interest in insuring that the professional use due care.  And a 
profession’s internal code of conduct suggests that its members 
themselves do not consider contracts a reliable way to determine their 
own professional obligations.  Put differently, the correct allocation of the 
risk of negligence between the parties is clear as a matter of public policy. 
It belongs with the professional.  If the job requires formal training and 
calls for complex judgments, a client is unlikely to be in a position to 
negotiate effectively with the professional anyway, so we don’t lose 
much—we probably lose nothing—by recognizing tort liability on top of 
whatever allocation of risks they might have made in their contract. 
Another part of the rationale for the exception might be found in the 
other policy behind limitations on liability for economic loss:  concern for 
indeterminate and disproportionate liability.  Those worries are not likely 
to be serious in a case of malpractice because the defendant’s liability is 
limited to the client—probably a single defendant (and not, in any event, 
a vast or unpredictable number of defendants), and probably for an 
amount that the professional could have calculated in advance if foresight 
of his potential exposure was felt to be important. 
This exception to the economic loss rule is too entrenched to remove 
from American jurisprudence, but no great harm would result if it were.  
A plaintiff who suffers economic loss as a result of professional’s 
                                                 
34 Note unsettled areas that could ripen into additional exceptions—bailments, principal/ 
agent. 
35 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 4(a) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 6, 2005). 
36 Id. 
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negligence invariably has a contract claim; whatever their written 
agreement may have said, an obligation of due care will be considered at 
least an implied term, and efforts to disclaim that obligation will rarely be 
given effect.37  So while it is an exception that must be recognized, the 
stakes of it are typically low.  It matters a great deal in those occasional 
cases in which the plaintiff reaps an incidental advantage from the tort 
claim, such as a longer statute of limitations by virtue of the discovery rule 
applicable in tort but not in contract.  But the availability of a tort suit to 
collect for pure economic loss is not systematically important to the 
malpractice victim. 
D. Liability in Tort Is Recognized When Economic Loss Results From Invited 
and Reasonable Reliance on the Words or Acts of the Defendant (Outside any 
Contract With the Plaintiff) 
Now suppose that the plaintiff and defendant didn’t have a contract 
and so aren’t subject to the economic loss rule.  When can the plaintiff sue 
to recover for economic loss caused by the defendant’s negligence?  The 
largest and most important answer involves cases in which the defendant 
acts for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff’s reliance on something the 
defendant says or does.  The plaintiff reasonably does rely and suffers 
losses as a result.  The classic example, mentioned earlier, is the accountant 
hired by a firm to produce an audit report that will satisfy the firm’s 
potential investors.  The investors have no contract with the accountant, 
but the purpose of the accountant’s work is to provide a basis on which 
they may rely.  If the accountant’s negligence causes the investors to lose 
their money, they can recover in tort.  The name of the claim is negligent 
misrepresentation, and it has become very important in commercial 
disputes.  (Before 1980 the phrase “negligent misrepresentation” appeared 
in American case law about 1000 times. Since 1980 it has appeared about 
25,000 times.)  If the reliance is on the defendant’s defective performance 
of an act rather than on negligently spoken or written words, the general 
theory of recovery is the same.  The causes of action have various detailed 
elements that will not be recited here; the interested reader is referred to 
the sources in the notes.38  The important point for now is to understand 
why claims with this structure are good candidates for liability in tort. 
The result might be explained by saying simply—perhaps too 
simply—that the law need not defer to contract in such a case because 
there isn’t a contract between the parties.  The explanation is too simple 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Bishop v. Owens, 272 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Idaho 2012); Spencer v. Barber, 299 P.3d 
388, 392 (N.M. 2013). 
38 See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 760–61 (Cal. 1992); RESTATEMENT THIRD, 
TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM OF TORTS § 5 (tentative draft 2012). 
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because the parties could have written a contract.  Some have argued in 
favor of extending the economic loss rule in this way, so that it forecloses 
tort claims for economic loss not just between parties who made contracts 
but between parties who could have made them.39  In the long run, and 
maybe sooner, such a rule would induce parties to write agreements that 
allocate all risks between them, and so would spare the courts the 
expensive and error-prone exercise of figuring out after calamity strikes 
what would have been reasonable for the defendant to do.  This is a 
plausible position.  For the sake of creating a useful incentive, however, 
this broader rule would create hard results in many cases where parties 
did not realize that they needed a contract to protect themselves. 
Consider a case from a different corner of the world.  Owner—
perhaps a town—hires Architect to design a building, then puts out the 
resulting plans for bids from contractors.  Builder submits the winning 
bid, gets then job, and soon discovers that Architect’s plans contain flaws 
that will make the project much more expensive than it appeared.  The 
question is whether Builder can sue Architect in tort.  The case is 
structurally very similar to the claim against the accountant described a 
moment ago, and is typically (but not in all states) treated the same way.40  
Architect understood that the plans would be used to provide a basis for 
bids by contractors, just as the accountant understood the audit would be 
used to provide a basis for reliance by investors.  Either can be sued in tort 
by the party who relied. 
But put aside the resemblance between the architect and the 
accountant, and consider the construction case just from the standpoint of 
policy.  Builder and Architect have no contract.  But they both have 
contracts with Owner and could have used those contracts to work out 
obligations and indemnities that would have covered possible glitches in 
Architect’s plans.  Why not force them to do it?  That is indeed the way it 
works in some states:  the tort claim is not recognized, so the lawyers must 
be careful to specify all contingencies of this kind when they write 
agreements running in various directions.41  This is well and good when a 
                                                 
39 See Posner, supra note 26, at 739. 
40 See Donnelly Construction Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Ariz. 
1984); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks 
Co., 222 N.E.2d 752, 754–55 (Mass. 1967); Prichard Bros., Inc. v. Grady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391, 
392 (Minn. 1988); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 288 
(Pa. 2005); Forte Bros., Inc. v. National Amusement, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301, 1303 (R.I. 1987); 
Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 87 (S.C. 
1995); Eastern Steel v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 268 (W. Va. 2001). 
41 A leading case for denying recovery is Berschauer/Phillips Construction Co. v. Seattle 
School District, 881 P.2d 986, 996 (Wash. 1994).  For a survey of case law both ways, see Marc 
M. Schneier, Annotation, Tort Liability of Project Architect or Engineer for Economic Damages 
Suffered by Contractor or Subcontractor, 61 A.L.R.6th 445 (2011). 
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project is large enough to command the time of sophisticated lawyers, or 
indeed any lawyers.  But now let Owner be a mere homeowner rather than 
a town, and let Builder be replaced by Artisan, who again relies heavily 
on Architect’s negligent guidance.  It might well come as a nasty surprise 
to Artisan to learn that he has no rights against Architect unless they make 
a contract of their own.  Those surprises may not be too large or very 
frequent, but they are unpleasant and probably inevitable when the law is 
not intuitive.  It is not intuitive to deny all relief to someone who is invited 
to rely on the work of another, who reasonably does rely, and who suffers 
financial loss when the work is carelessly done.42 
And for all that, it might be more efficient just to recognize the tort 
claim and save everyone in these situations the bother of anticipating such 
issues in their contracts.  The reasonableness required by the law of torts 
from the architect or accountant is likely to be what everyone in the picture 
wants from them anyway.  If they don’t wish to bear the risk that sort of 
liability, they are free to make contracts saying so and insisting on 
indemnification from whoever hires them.  In effect the tort liability is a 
default rule, and a substitute for contracts between parties who might find 
them inconvenient or outright infeasible to make.  When the lawyers 
involved are sophisticated, the Coase theorem suggests that they will 
reach the same allocation of risks whether tort liability runs in the 
background or not.43  When the lawyers involved are not sophisticated (or 
there aren’t any lawyers), allowing the tort claim gives the parties the 
allocation of risk they most likely would have expected and wanted if they 
had reflected on the question in advance. 
So deference to contract is, on balance, an unpersuasive reason to turn 
down claims in tort to recover for financial loss caused by negligent 
misrepresentations.  What about the other policy in play—the concern for 
disproportionate and indeterminate liability?  That is a legitimate worry.  
A negligent misrepresentation may be heard and induce action by large 
numbers of people, and may then be repeated to still more.44  The resulting 
liabilities for an ill-considered statement could thus be massive and cause 
parties accustomed to speaking to curtail their activity unduly.  If a 
newspaper were subject to large-scale liabilities for misprinting a stock 
price, for example, it would need to think twice about printing them at 
                                                 
42 For further discussion of the meaning of “invited” reliance, see Mark Gergen, The Ambit 
of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 752–59 (2006). 
43 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). 
44 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.) (“If liability 
for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery 
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”). 
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all.45  But this problem is best addressed not by rejecting liability but by 
defining the tort in a manner that limits the risk of such outcomes.  Thus 
liability for negligent misrepresentation requires a statement directed to a 
limited audience for a limited purpose.46  This requirement has an 
arguable perversity about it; it means that a very widely distributed 
misstatement—say, the mistake in the morning paper—produces no 
liability, whereas liability is intact when the same misstatement is made to 
one or two people.  But it makes sense as a matter of policy.  The speaker 
to a limited audience can make a rational estimate of his potential 
liabilities and take appropriate precautions in response.  The speaker to a 
huge audience would have a harder time doing that, and the cost to the 
public if that speaker goes silent as a result may be substantial.47 
E. There Is No Liability in Tort for Economic Loss Caused to a Plaintiff by 
Injury to the Person or Property of Another Party 
This rule might almost go without saying, because it is a rule against 
liability rather than in favor of it.  Since liability for economic loss has to 
be established on some particular ground, why bother explaining the non-
existence of liability in any given area?  But remember that Rule 1 is not a 
general statement of “no duty.”  It just states that duties have to 
specifically established.  It is very helpful to the cause of clarity when we 
can round up common categories of economic loss and say whether any 
duty of care exists with respect to them. In this instance we can take a 
good-sized set of problems and deal with them at once.  The rule stated 
here, in other words, removes a large category of potential claims from the 
case-by-case analysis that is called for when a fact pattern falls outside any 
settled category.  This category exists, and is settled.48 
We have seen the outlines of this rule at other points in the Article:  
the restaurant that cannot be reached after the defendant knocks down a 
nearby bridge cannot sue the defendant for damages; only the owner of 
the bridge can sue.  The primary reasons for the rule are concerns about 
indeterminate and runaway liability.  An act of negligence that damages 
property may cause inconvenience and financial loss to countless others 
                                                 
45 See Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 898 (Ohio 1986); see also Stancik v. CNBC, 
420 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 733, 739–40 (D. 
Md. 1995); Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). 
46 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 4(b) (tentative draft 
2012). 
47 See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564–65 (7th Cir. 1987). 
48 For leading statements, see Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1027 
(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1985); 
532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc., v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 
2001); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 581 (W. Va. 2000). 
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who would have found the property useful.  Deference to contract is not 
an issue in quite the sense we have seen before; allowing liability in these 
cases is not especially likely to interfere with allocations of risk that parties 
have otherwise made.  But as observed earlier, the hard-luck features of a 
case in this category can sometimes be mitigated by a prudent use of 
contract, either as a vehicle for insurance or as a vehicle for direct recovery 
from the party who suffered physical injury.  An illustration may be built 
from the well-known case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.49  A 
bystander negligently breaks a propeller on a ship that is in dry dock for 
repairs, and this causes losses to a shipper who had been hoping to rent 
the vessel a week later.  The disappointed shipper can’t collect from the 
bystander, because the shipper doesn’t own the ship or the propeller.  But 
of course the owner of the ship can sue the bystander in tort for breaking 
the propeller; and if the shipper had a contract to hire the ship, and the 
ship is no longer available, the shipper can sue the owner in contract. 
A striking feature of this branch of our subject is its inflexibility.  One 
could well imagine courts looking at such cases one at a time and allowing 
plaintiffs to proceed when their facts seem to be outside the reasons for 
the general rule against recovery.  That is not the American preference.  
The doctrine is a rule, not a standard.50  Courts have not felt that they can 
distinguish in a sufficiently principled manner between those who are 
inside and outside the rule’s rationale.  This might seem a harsh approach, 
and one that allows a legal rule to run too far out in front of the policies 
behind it.  But perhaps the unbending character of the rule is better viewed 
as giving effect to other important other policies—namely clarity, 
simplicity, and predictability.  If the cost of this rigidity seems too high, 
relief can be provided selectively by statute, as was done in the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990.51 
In many cases that fall under this rule, a “best” plaintiff—or in any 
event a plaintiff better than those who suffered pure economic loss—is 
positioned to sue the negligent party:  the owner of the damaged boat can 
sue whoever broke the propeller, the owner of the bridge can sue the 
owner of the boat that collided with it, and so on.  The threat of a suit by 
that party provides the potential tortfeasor with salutary pressure to take 
care, and relieves the pressure to allow claims by others whose losses came 
later and were economic in character.  But sometimes there is no better 
plaintiff than one who has suffered pure economic loss.  That is so when 
                                                 
49 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (Holmes, J.). 
50 The arguments for and against the inflexibility are well expressed by the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Louisiana ex rel. Guste, 752 F.2d at 1019. 
51 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61 (1994); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in 
Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 335, 384–86 (2011). 
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the defendant damages property that has no owner.  A spill of oil or other 
toxins into a waterway is the classic example.  It may occur in waters that 
are used by many but in which no plaintiff has a proprietary interest 
sufficient to support a tort claim for physical injury.  Some solace in these 
circumstances, however, can be found in the law of public nuisance, which 
allows a plaintiff with purely economic injuries to sue a defendant who 
damages a public resource.52 
Recognizing claims of public nuisance to recover for pure economic 
loss can create the same worries about runaway liability that we have 
already seen; the potential for an oil spill to affect many thousands of 
victims is well known and has been demonstrated many times.53  Letting 
all of them sue might create substantial burdens for courts.  Some of those 
burdens could no doubt be relieved by a thoughtful use of the class action 
and other forms of aggregate litigation,54 but often the many victims of a 
public nuisance have individualized claims that would make aggregation 
difficult.  The common law addresses these difficulties by use of a strategy 
that by now is familiar:  it limits recovery to those plaintiffs who have 
“special” injuries—that is, injuries different in kind from those suffered by 
members of the affected community in general.55  The requirement is 
analogous to the rule in cases of negligent misrepresentation that the 
defendant can be held liable for utterances made to limited audiences but 
not to large ones.56  It may seem strange for the law to show such solicitude 
for the “big time” tortfeasor who injures immense numbers of people, but 
again there are practical policies at stake.  Courts do not want to be 
inundated with an unmanageable number of suits; they would prefer to 
insist that a “best plaintiff” be found to collect from the defendant and 
create an incentive for better care next time, even if that means no recovery 
for anyone when no such plaintiff can be found. 
No discussion of liability for injury to property that the claimant does 
not own would be complete without a reference to a famous supposed 
exception to the rules on point:  fishermen.  Courts in a prominent line of 
cases have allowed fishermen to recover when their catch is diminished 
                                                 
52 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 8 (tentative draft 
2012). 
53 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 478 (2008); In re Deepwater Horizon, 
732 F.3d 326, 341–43 (5th Cir. 2013). 
54 As discussed in Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1135–36 (Haw. 1982). 
55 See Harbor Beach Surf Club, Inc. v. Water Taxi of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 711 So.2d 1230 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 
N.E.2d 1097, 1100–04 (N.Y. 2001); In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litigation, 820 F. Supp. 1460, 
1480 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance:  Solving the Paradox of 
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 761, 816–18 (2001). 
56 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM OF TORTS § 5 (tentative 
draft 2012). 
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by a tortfeasor’s damage to the boat on which they are traveling or to the 
waters in which they are fishing.57  These results might seem inconsistent 
with the general rule against recovery by plaintiffs for harm done to 
property they do not own.  But the inconsistency is superficial.  In the well-
reasoned cases, fishermen recover on either of two implied or express 
theories.  In the first they are working on a lay agreement in which they 
receive little or no money up front; the owner of the boat instead pays 
them a share of the catch brought in on the trip.  The boat is then damaged 
by the defendant, destroying (let us imagine) the prospects for a 
productive fishing trip.  The boat’s owner plainly can sue the defendant 
for the harm done to it; and if he does, some of the damages he wins for 
lost profits from the voyage rightfully belong to the crew (since they had 
a contractual entitlement to a share of the profits under their lay 
agreement).  The crew’s award can be secured by a constructive trust 
imposed on a share of the owner’s winnings;58 or the crew can bring a 
claim against the owner sounding in restitution to recover for his unjust 
enrichment; or finally, and of most interest here, the crew can be allowed 
to skip the middleman and sue the defendant directly.59  This latter step is 
best understood as a procedural convenience rather than as an meaningful 
exception to the usual rule against liability for economic loss caused by 
damage to someone else’s property.  Allowing the fishermen to sue 
whoever damaged the boat does not enable the fishermen to recover more 
than they would have been able to obtain anyway by constructive trust or 
by a claim for restitution from the ship’s owner. 
In the other set of cases won by fishermen, they are suing for public 
nuisance and claiming that their injuries are distinct in kind from those 
suffered by others who enjoyed benefits from the same waterways.60  
Often they make that argument effectively.  The courts are no doubt 
attracted to the notion of letting someone bring suit against whoever 
spoiled a local waterway.  The businesses adjacent to the water are 
numerous and hard to distinguish from one another; letting the local 
fishermen sue is an easy way to achieve some justice and to draw, between 
those who can and cannot sue, a line that at least is familiar even if not 
deeply defensible.  At any rate, recognizing claims by fishermen in this 
way makes them beneficiaries of the rules governing public nuisance, not 
                                                 
57 See Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398–99 (4th Cir. 1997); Carbone v. 
Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953); Burgess v. The M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. 
Me. 1973), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
58 See discussion in Jensen v. Goresen, 881 P.2d 1119, 1123–24 (Alaska 1994). 
59 Carbone, 209 F.2d at 182 makes clear the link between the fishermen’s rights against the 
owner of the vessel and their right to sue the tortfeasor directly. 
60 See Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250–51; see also Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, 39 So.3d 1216, 
1223–28 (Fla. 2010); Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846–47 (N.Y. 1989). 
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an exception to them, let alone an exception to the general rule that a tort 
claim for negligence cannot be brought against a party who injured 
someone else.  Going forward, then, the less said the better about any 
general “fisherman’s exception” to the rules governing liability for 
economic loss.61  That expression has its charms, but it leaves the 
misleading impression that the law has a general desire for fishermen to 
make out better than other plaintiffs—a silly proposition. 
F.  Decide Remaining Cases by Direct Application of the Policies Bearing on 
Recovery for Economic Loss 
The patterns discussed so far account for most situations in which the 
negligence of one party causes pure economic loss to another.  But various 
other such cases arise on a miscellaneous or “one-off” basis, and they are 
best resolved by asking directly whether it is reasonable to expect the 
parties to protect themselves by contract, whether recognizing the claim 
in tort would create risks of indeterminate liability, and whether liability 
is necessary to advance any other interest, such as the preservation of a 
tortfeasor’s incentives to be more careful next time.  Let us consider some 
examples. 
a.  A lawyer is hired to write a will for a client and commits some 
blunder that is found, after the client dies, to have made the will 
ineffective.  The client wanted the estate to pass to one heir, but instead it 
passes to another.  Some courts would leave the disappointed heir to 
argue for a remedy as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the 
lawyer and client;62 assume this won’t work, either on the particular facts 
of the case or in general, because the disappointed heir does not meet the 
requirements of third-party beneficiary doctrine (neither the lawyer nor 
the client meant to give that heir the right to sue anyone).  Should the 
unhappy party be able to sue the lawyer in tort?  Probably so.63  Yes, it is 
a claim for pure economic loss founded on negligence. But note that the 
case is not governed by any of the general rules yet articulated.  First, the 
parties—that is, the intended heir who brings the suit and the lawyer who 
wrote the will—had no contract, so the economic loss rule does not touch 
the case.  Nor, secondly, does the exception apply that allows 
                                                 
61 A notion aptly criticized in Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 78, 79–80 (D. 
Mass. 1959). 
62 See Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J.); Joan Teshima, Annotation, 
What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other Than Immediate 
Client, 61 A.L.R.4th 464 §§ 1–3 (1988). 
63 See Harrigfield v. Hancock, 90 P.3d 884 887–88 (Idaho 2004); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 
N.W.2d 679, 682–83 (Iowa 1987); Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 226–27 (Ill. 1984); Pizel v. 
Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Mich. 1996); 
Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 208–09 (W. Va. 2005). 
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professionals to be sued by their clients (the client is dead).  Third, the 
lawyer’s purpose was not to create a basis for reliance by the plaintiff (and 
anyway the plaintiff did not rely).  Finally, the plaintiff did not suffer 
economic loss on account of personal injury or property damage to 
someone else.  Since the rules yet crystallized do not settle the case, we 
undertake direct consideration of how the policies at stake in this field 
bear on it. 
Begin by observing that the plaintiff’s claim creates no significant risk 
of indeterminate liability.  On the contrary, the lawyer who takes on a job 
of this kind can see from the start the size of the stakes involved and his 
possible exposure if he errs.  He can buy insurance accordingly.  Deference 
to contract is not an issue, either, because the disappointed heir has no 
contract with the lawyer (and probably couldn’t have made one).  The 
party who did have a contract with the lawyer is, by assumption, dead, so 
there is no risk that a tort suit by the disappointed heir will interfere with 
enforcement of that contract.  And the client’s unavailability also supports 
liability in another sense:  if the disappointed heir cannot sue the lawyer, 
probably no one can.  But someone should.  So there are good reasons to 
allow the suit and no particular reasons to object to it.  The plaintiff has a 
good claim.  This is not an exception to the economic loss rule or any other 
rule.  It is simply a decision about a specific fact pattern made by applying 
the policies that govern the existence of liability in tort for pure economic 
loss. 
b.  Buyer of a house discovers an expensive defect in it that was caused 
by negligence on the part of Builder.  Buyer wants to sue Builder but has 
no contract with him; Buyer bought the house from a previous owner 
(who in turn had bought it from Builder).  What result?  Again, the case is 
not addressed by the economic loss rule or any of the other rules yet 
stated.  After application of the policies behind those rules, however, the 
best answer is no liability in tort.64  This case is unlike the earlier ones 
involving accountants and architects because here the builder’s purpose 
was not to provide a basis for reliance by the eventual buyer.  This case is 
more similar to one in which the purchaser of a product finds that it does 
not perform well and is confined to the law of contract for any remedies.  
It may help to recall that the mere absence of a contract between Buyer 
                                                 
64 See Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 
1246–47 (Fla. 1993); Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Newtown Meadows ex rel. its Bd. of 
Dirs. v. Venture 15, Inc., 167 P.3d 225, 278–80 (Haw. 2007); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 
N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ill. 1982); Moglia v. McNeil Co., Inc., 700 N.W.2d 608, 614–17 (Neb. 2005); 
Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1266 (Nev. 2000); Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 
Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, 221 P.3d 234, 242–43 (Utah 2009); 
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57–58 (Va. 1988); Stuart 
v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 745 P.2d 1284, 1289–91 (Wash. 1987). 
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and Builder does not mean that Buyer has no way to protect himself.  
Buyer has a contract with the owner who sold him the house.  Perhaps 
that previous owner had a warranty from Builder that is transferable. 
c.  Subcontractor A’s work is made more expensive by the blunders of 
Subcontractor B on a construction job.  Note, first, that the economic loss 
rule does not touch the case because Subcontractors A and B do not have 
a contract with each other.  This might seem to resemble the cases in which 
an architect and a builder have no contract with each other but both have 
contracts with the owner of a construction project.  Here the two 
subcontractors may have contracts with the same prime contractor.  But 
the resemblance is only superficial because subcontractors do not 
ordinarily invite reliance by each other; to put it in the language of the 
Restatement, Subcontractor A does not act for the purpose of providing a 
basis for reliance by Subcontractor B.  Rather, Subcontractor A acts 
primarily for the benefit of Contractor—but his negligence may well have 
expensive side effects for B.  The absence of invited reliance removes an 
important limiting idea from this case that was present in the earlier ones. 
d.  Consider, finally, an especially difficult scenario.  Firm hires Tester 
to test Firm’s employees for drug use. Tester negligently reports a false 
positive on Worker, who is then fired.  Worker wants to sue Tester.  The 
economic loss rule does not apply because Worker and Tester have no 
contract. Nor was Tester seeking to provide a basis for reliance by Worker.  
We are again left to apply the policies at issue in cases of economic loss 
directly to the facts.  Indeterminate liability doesn’t seem to be a problem; 
Tester can estimate its possible error rate and the stakes of litigation that 
will result if it makes mistakes.  Nor is deference in order to any contract 
between Worker and Tester, since they have none.  But contract does play 
an important role in the case.  Tester had a contract with Firm, and 
breached it.  Firm can sue Tester, and should; and Worker could have 
bargained for protections against wrongful dismissal in any employment 
contract with Firm.  So if Tester is negligent, Tester pays Firm and Firm 
pays Worker.  Contracts running between them solve the problem, and 
that process of contracting is entitled to deference. 
Alas, this account is too optimistic at every juncture.  “Worker” in a 
case of this kind is often an at-will employee who cannot feasibly obtain 
contractual protections from Firm. And Firm may well have little 
incentive to pursue possible claims that Tester’s negligence has caused one 
of Firm’s employees to be needlessly discharged.65  Firm may reason that 
there are plenty more employees where Worker came from, and perhaps 
Tester’s rate of error is tolerably low.  So Worker can’t sue Firm and Firm 
                                                 
65 See Posner, supra note 26, at 742–43; Rabin, supra note 20, at 867–69. 
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won’t bother to sue Tester.  The actual efficacy of contract to control this 
situation is therefore very questionable.  On the other hand, allowing 
Worker to sue Tester creates odd effects of its own.  If Firm does its own 
in-house testing, rules of agency and employment law will prevent an at-
will Worker from suing Firm or the fellow employee who negligently 
performed the test.66  Why should the result be different when Firm hires 
an outside company to do the testing? 
In the end, the policies bearing on this fact pattern are so finely 
balanced that a result either way is defensible, so it is no surprise that 
courts have reached a range of results in handling it.67  The important 
point to observe in this discussion is that when a claim for pure economic 
loss arises outside the established rules that govern the most familiar 
patterns, analysis of how the relevant policies apply is not an abstract 
exercise.  It calls for close engagement with the details of the situation and 
a realistic look at whether the problems at stake are likely to be solved by 
contract if liability in tort is not available. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Some courts have suggested, in effect, that the “economic loss rule” 
means there is no recovery in tort for pure economic loss, except when 
there is.  The exceptions are then very numerous and confusing.  The 
question is not the accuracy of such a statement but the utility of it.  Courts 
taking that position have been motivated by a commendable desire to 
clarify and simplify the law, but the resulting cases have tended to be 
unwieldy as well as inconsistent across jurisdictions.  This Article, which 
summarizes the conclusions reached after investigation by the American 
Law Institute, has set forth a version of the economic loss rule that is safer 
to state and considerably more useful:  There is no liability in tort for pure 
economic loss resulting from negligence in the negotiation or performance 
                                                 
66 See RESTATEMENT THIRD, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.04 (2015). 
67 For cases declining to find a duty of care, see Erpelding v. Lisek, 71 P.3d 754, 760 (Wyo. 
2003); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 353–54 (Tex. 1995); Devine v. Roche 
Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 637 A.2d 441, 447–48 (Me. 1994); Rand v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655, 
657–58 (W.Va. 1991); Felton v. Schaeffer, 229 Cal. Rptr. 229, 239 (Cal. 1991); Herbert v. Placid 
Reference Co., 564 So. 2d 371, 373–74 (La. 1990); Hall v. United Parcel Service of America, 555 
N.E.2d 273, 276–77 (N.Y. 1990). For cases and arguments in favor of liability on similar or 
analogous facts, see Sharpe v. St. Luke's Hospital, 821 A.2d 1215, 1218–21 (Pa. 2003); Duncan v. 
Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 742–46 (Wyo. 1999); Merrick v. Thomas, 522 N.W.2d 402, 405–07 (Neb. 
1994); Amy Newman & Jay M. Feinman, Liability of a Laboratory for Negligent Employment or 
Pre-Employment Drug Testing, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 473 (1999).  For additional discussion and 
authorities both ways, see Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Employee’s Action in Tort Against 
Party Administering Polygraph, Drug, or Similar Test at Request of Actual or Prospective Employer, 
89 A.L.R.4th 527, §§ 1(a)−15(b) (1991). 
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of a contract between the parties.  Many other cases of pure economic loss 
can also be resolved by rule.  A professional can be held liable for negligent 
performance of a contract with the plaintiff (notwithstanding the 
economic loss rule).  If the parties do not have a contract, liability is found 
when a defendant has acted for the purpose of providing the other with a 
basis for reliance and the other then reasonably relied.  Finally, a plaintiff 
cannot collect in tort for economic loss caused by injury to the person or 
property of a third party. 
Each of the rules just set forth can be made the subject of more detailed 
explanation and qualification, of course, but the qualifications do not 
impair their fundamental accuracy.  Those rules cover most of the 
common cases in which plaintiffs suffer economic loss on account of a 
defendant’s negligence.  Most importantly, they are consistent with the 
policies at stake in the field:  deference to contract, avoidance of 
indeterminate liability, and due regard for the values of clarity and 
predictability.  Remaining cases that arise outside the rules just 
summarized are best resolved by direct application of those same policies 
one case at a time until the results crystallize into further rules of their 
own. 
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